Abstract
I. Introduction
The property market in the United States over the last decade has been widely perceived as having had a bubble. Figure 1 depicts the national rates of growth of house prices, ten-year Treasuries, an index of imputed homeowner rents, and the Consumer Price Index. The Figure   shows acceleration in house prices after 1999 that is not consistent with the other data. We analyze post 1999 behavior of house price growth in the U.S. in order to characterize the change in price growth. We stop after 2005 when the price surge stopped. In particular, we look at the extent to which we can characterize the period as having a "bubble" relative to the "fundamentals" of price growth. We define a bubble as a regime shift that is characterized by a change in the properties of deviations of actual house price growth from its fundamentals.
The fundamentals come from an estimated equation specifying house price growth as a function of lagged responses to the present value of expected future service flows (imputed rent). In a bubble, a shock to the growth rates is more self-sustaining (increased momentum) and/or more volatile than in other periods.
Various methods have been used to test for bubbles in financial markets. Early work relied on econometric methods such as variance-bound tests. Since then, tests for stationarity and cointegration as tests for absence of speculative bubbles have been proposed (see, for example, Diba and Grossman (1988) and Hamilton and Whiteman (1985) ). Evans (1991), however, shows that these methods tend to reject the presence of the bubbles too often even if they are artificially induced in the Monte Carlo simulations. The literature on testing bubbles then moved on to the introduction of more effective regime switching models first presented by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . These models look at bubbles as changes in regime, and then analyze properties of price processes in and out of the bubble regimes.
1 Our model is a variant of these regime shift models.
Apart from Roche (2001) , who studied the Dublin market from 1976 to 1999, regimeswitching models have not been widely applied in explaining house price bubbles. The structure of our model is similar to papers on housing bubbles by Black et al. (2006) , Chan et al. (2001) , Hwang et al. (2006) and Taipalus (2006) . Wheaton and Nechayef (2007) Order and Dougherty (1991) test a rent-price model similar to the one developed in this
paper. An alternative line of research looks at bubbles as coming from "overshooting" of estimated difference equations for house price (e.g., Capozza et al (2004) )
Our principal result is that while we find evidence of momentum in the deviations from house price growth fundamentals throughout the period, momentum increased after 1999. We do not find much evidence of explosive momentum, although momentum after 1999 was close to explosive in some cities. We do not find evidence of an increase in volatility in the disturbances of the error process. We also find that momentum operates with a long lag.
Breaking down the period further, we find that 2003 was a watershed year. The bubble happened mostly after 2003; that is, it was for a relatively short period and a period that was associated with big changes in markets, such as the rise of the subprime market and subprime securtization and a sharp decline in short term interest rates. Before that price changes were by and large "explained" by the fundamentals, for instance the decline in long term real rates in the early part of the 1999-2005 period.
The next section provides a discussion on bubbles and regime switching models that have been widely applied in financial markets. Section III presents our model of house price growth. In particular, we develop the fundamental equation from which bubbles in the market are tested. Section IV describes the data employed, while Section V presents the results.
Section VI discusses the robustness of our tests, and Section VII analyses the momentum phenomenon further. Section VIII concludes the study.
II. Bubbles and Regime Switching
There has been considerable research on modeling the price movements of stock markets in order to model deviations from the fundamental values. 2 Two versions of these models are the fads model proposed by Summers (1986) and the stochastic bubbles model suggested by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . The latter type was subsequently extended by Van Norden and Schaller (1993, 1996) , and Van Norden, (1996) , who use switching regressions to describe the time-varying relationship between returns and deviations from the fundamentals.
The Fads model
Borrowing from Fama and French (1988) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) , the logarithm of the market price of an asset is divided into (1) a non-stationary part that describes the fundamental price and (2) a stationary component that implies the returns are predictable (from previous returns). Both components are autoregressive and subject to 2 Other proposed sources of bubbles are, for example, overconfidence of speculators coming from two different groups such that the deviations in price expectations create trading (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)), and money illusion as a result of reduction in inflation, and hence nominal mortgage costs (Brunnermeier and Julliard (2006) This regression equation gives the excess returns as a function of differences between the log of the proxy for the fundamental and the log of the observed price. In finance models a commonly used proxy is the dividend, while the explanatory variable in the equation is the lagged log dividend/price ratio. Hence, price growth is a function of current price and lagged fundamentals. Because the current price (via equation (1)) depends on the dividend/price ratio lagged again, iterating equation (1) implies that price appreciation depends on a long lagged function of the proxy for fundamentals.
However, in this model, the assumptions that the fundamentals follow a random walk and that the fads part is stationary are not likely to hold. This is because of obvious inefficiencies in real estate markets: (1) transaction costs in real estate are high, (2) owner-occupiers are only in the market occasionally, and (3) the tax benefits accrued to homeowners reduce their costs but not costs for speculators, thus making arbitrage difficult. Hence, some modification is required in order to apply the model.
The Regime Switching Model
When the regression error term, t e , is heteroscedastic, the fads model can lead to regimeswitching for stochastic bubbles (they are stochastic because they either survive or collapse, subject to some probabilities). The existence of two possible outcomes of the bubbles means that there are two regimes generating market returns. We extend the regime-switching model by relaxing the assumption that the error term in the autoregressive fundamental price process is white noise. We assume that t e follows an autoregressive process. A regime shift is characterized by an increase in the volatility of the disturbance in the autoregressive process
for t e and an increase in "momentum," which is measured as increase in the sum of the coefficients of the lagged t e in the process.
III. Modeling the Fundamentals of House Price Growth
Given an information set, t Ω , the fundamental value of a property is assumed to be given by (in principle, this should be net rent and net of costs, similar to net operating income):
where R is the rental income, in this case imputed services of the property, and D is the riskadjusted discount factor. In addition, the transversality condition that the second term approach zero gives
For this to be applicable to owner-occupied housing, imputed rent must be measurable by some form of market rent. We take this to be the actual market rent of comparable properties, which holds if the equation is applied to an owner who is just indifferent between owning and renting. In that case, the first order conditions for owners and renters will be the same; and the present value formulation that applies to landlords' valuation will apply to owneroccupiers' valuation. The advantage of this approach is that it saves having to develop a complicated model of housing demand and supply, which is not likely to be stable. For instance, Glaeser et al (2005) emphasize the role of inelastic supply in house price growth, especially due to local policy variation; our rent variable captures this effect without having to estimate, directly or indirectly, supply elasticities across cities and time.
Estimated Equations
Equation (3) is potentially quite complicated because of the covariance among the variables such as those coming from stock-flow adjustments of rents and prices over time. For instance,
we should expect interest rates and future rents to be correlated because a rise in interest rates will, given rents, lower property values. On the other hand, it induces less production in the future, and thus higher rents. Indeed, if supply is perfectly elastic in the long run, a rise in interest rates will eventually produce a decline in rents without long run price change.
We consider first a simple model with constant interest rates and a steady growth rate of expected rents. We can adopt the Gordon model for stock prices to property value as
is the "cap rate" for housing, i, the interest rate, and * π is the expected rates of growth of rent. The coefficients i α and π α do not necessarily equal one, as they are in the standard Gordon model, because of tax and other effects (such as cash flow effects from high nominal rates and lack of price indexed mortgages).
Taking first differences and logarithms of equation (4) Preliminary estimates of equation (6) do not work well; longer lags in the adjustment process are necessary for the model to fit well and/or make sense. We therefore consider adjustment of the form:
Equation (7) imposes the constraint that an increase in growth rate of rent of 1% will increase house price growth by 1% in the long run. The presence of α allows rents and prices to have different trends, for instance, because of measurement errors.
Estimates of equation (7) (especially before 1985) . If any of the above is the case, then there will be a tendency for our measure of P to grow faster than our measure of R (that is, for α in equation (6) to be positive), which is indeed what we find.
IV. Data and Estimation
Third, the price and rent series do not necessarily match up in the sense of the price series representing price growth for a household that is indifferent between owning and renting, which is probably a household in a relatively low tax bracket. We note here that the OFHEO index only covers prices of houses whose mortgages are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. This imposes a limit, which is indexed to house prices over time, and thereby excludes approximately the top 10% of the market (by number of loans). Hence, the price data does at least exclude those owners who for tax reasons are the furthest from being rate series. We do not use mortgage rates because, among other things, they include premia for prepayment risk.
There is a risk premium attached to i, which we assume is a part of D, the discount factor.
indifferent between owning and renting. We have not chosen to use the widely used CaseShiller Indexes because of the wider coverage of the OFHEO Indexes.
With these data, we first estimate variants of the fundamentals of price growth from the specifications of ρ in equation (7) characterized by a change in the error process. We test for changes in the sum of the coefficients in estimates of equation (8) and changes in the variance of the residuals in the error regression in (8). Table 1 summarizes the estimates of our fundamental equation (7), using the entire panel of data across MSAs for the entire sample period and with exogenous variables lagged 12, 16, 20, and 24 quarters. The variables mostly have the expected signs. The signs within groups are also consistent, generally negative for interest rate and positive for past rent growth. The model implies a significant lag in the effect of an interest rate change on house prices. Table   2 presents a summary of the results of the coefficients for various lag lengths of the fundamentals. Longer lag specifications fit better, and their coefficients make more economic sense. 5 The nonbubble MSAs tend to have smaller constant terms, averaging close to zero vs. around 1.5% per year in the bubble MSAs.
V. Results

Estimates of the Fundamentals
The coefficients suggest overshooting. For instance, looking at the longer lags, rent increases are initially associated with price acceleration, as expected; but the sign turns negative after around four years. This implies that an interest rate shock is associated with positive effects on price growth which turn negative in a year or so. Note that there is a sharp turn to positive coefficients after five years in the longest lagged equation, leading to small but positive long run effect (see Table 2 ). Hence, the model suggests the possibility of a small long run effect of interest rate changes, perhaps because of a long run supply adjustment, but only after a long adjustment period.
Error Equations
We use the fundamental equations to generate errors equations, and then examine autoregressive properties of these errors as given by equation (8). As described above, we divide the available data into bubble and nonbubble MSAs, and we produce separate estimates of the error model by these MSA divisions in the pre-and post-1999 period. Results for the residuals from the 12-lag fundamental equation are shown in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 depicts the corresponding findings for the 16-lag model 6 , while the sums of the residual coefficients are provided in Table 3 . We also estimated error equations from the fundamental equation with 8 lags and 12 lags with lagged ρ on the right hand side, which give similar results as shown in Appendices 4 and 5. We therefore focus on the fundamental equation without lagged ρ. 5 We initially tried to establish the fundamental model with local CPI to capture the MSA specific inflation, and in a way, deduce the real interest rate. However, adding the variable does not increase the explanatory power and intuition of the model significantly. We therefore maintain the current model for parsimony. 6 Results on 20-lag and 24-lag models are available upon request.
From Table 3 , the sums of coefficients in all of the specifications are positive; and in all cases, the sum increased after 1999. On average, the increase in sums was around 0.2 or 0.3; the bubble MSAs mostly have higher sums, averaging around 0.8.
Basic results for the coefficient sums are that momentum exists throughout the period, an increase in momentum after 1999, long adjustment lags, and general agreement about the increase in momentum across different estimates (varying by lag) of the fundamentals. The latter provides evidence of a regime shift in the post-1999 period. However, there is no evidence of an explosive bubble associated with the regime shift; coefficient sums are always significantly less than one (see footnote to Table 2 ). 7 The change in momentum is economically significant; the sums in bubble cities went from around 0.5 to around 0.8.
Consider a 1% shock in one quarter. In the pre bubble case the long run effect of the shocks on price relative to rent is 1%/(1 -0.5) or 2%, but becomes 1%/(1 -0.8) or 5% in the post bubble period.
It is possible that the bubbles became bigger in the later part of the post-bubble period. We as a whole or, in the case of the bubble MSAs, lower. We discuss this second period below. Table 4 presents results for testing the changes in the volatility of the errors in equation (8).
Volatility
We apply the Goldfield-Quandt test for the differences in variances. 
VI. Robustness of the Fundamentals
We estimated variations of the fundamentals to see if the error equations still lead to findings that are similar to the ones we obtained in the previous section. We first separated the data set for the fundamentals into those for bubble MSAs and non-bubble MSAs and estimated separate panel regressions (regression results depicted in Appendix 6). The rationale is that, assuming bubble and non-bubble markets are separate groups, intra-group markets might share identical effects from the factors in the fundamental equation, but not inter-group markets. As expected, the error equations (with 8, 12, and 16 lags), shown in Appendix 7, are different between the two groups of MSAs. The test results of differences in variances between pre-bubble and post-bubble periods are depicted in Panel A of Appendix 9. The sensitivity to a change in the regression does not however alter our previous conclusions about changes in momentum.
Our second variation included the inflation rate into the fundamental equation. This allows the discount rate to be thought of composed of a real rate plus real rent growth, and these might not have the same coefficients (e.g., because of different measurement errors).
Furthermore, local inflation may contain information about rent, or its determinants that is not in the rental equivalent index (e.g., the rental data series might be too smooth or grow too 
VII. How much is explained by Fundamentals?
We do not get a significantly separate regime shift after 2002. Nonetheless, that period is problematic. It is probably too short to be able to differentiate statistically from the entire bubble period. However, it does show sharp acceleration in house prices (see Figure 1 ). This period coincided with the sudden decrease in short term interest rates, a sudden increase in the share of subprime loans and subprime securitization in the market and a sharp increase in the use of Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) in this market. This was at a time when shortterm rates were unusually low relative to long-term rates. Appeal to the Modigliani Irrelevance Theorem suggests that while the use of ARMs is fine, it should be largely irrelevant; the rate for discounting cash flows of long-term assets like housing is still a longterm rate. To the extent that the advent of subprime ARMs stimulated purchase of housing because a new class of homeowners discounted at low short term ARM rates (along with poor underwriting of subprime loans), we have a potentially large shock to the fundamentals, which should in turn generate momentum.
To get a finer picture of the period, we simulated the fundamentals models to see how much of the actual change in prices, by MSA and nationally, was "explained" by the predictions of the estimated fundamentals models during the first part of the period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and the second (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Table 5 depicts results using the version of the fundamental equation in Table 1 The table suggests that the fundamentals did a reasonably good job of explaining the first part of the bubble period, and the estimated equation explained over half of the increase in prices relative to rents. This was probably due to the decline in long term Treasury rates over the period. However, very little is explained, especially in the bubble MSAs, in the second part of the period. This suggests that there was not much of a bubble before 2003 and that most of the high house price growth was explained by low long term rates. However, the long term rates did not fall at the end of the period and that appears as the main part of the bubble. 
VIII. Conclusions
Perhaps the best way to characterize housing markets during our sample period is that (1) there were always bubbles in the sense of disturbances generating momentum, (2) 1 9 8 0 0 1 1 9 8 1 0 1 1 9 8 2 0 1 1 9 8 3 0 1 1 9 8 4 0 1 1 9 8 5 0 1 1 9 8 6 0 1 1 9 8 7 0 1 1 9 8 8 0 1 1 9 8 9 0 1 1 9 9 0 0 1 1 9 9 1 0 1 1 9 9 2 0 1 1 9 9 3 0 1 1 9 9 4 0 1 1 9 9 5 0 1 1 9 9 6 0 1 1 9 9 7 0 1 1 9 9 8 0 1 1 9 9 9 0 1 2 0 "***", "**", "*" represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 2 Comparison of Sum of Coefficients from the Fundamental Equation (7)
Coefficients are from 
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